An Evaluation of Mature Performance-Based Logistics Programs by Lucyshyn, William & Rigilano, John
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2019-04-30
An Evaluation of Mature Performance-Based
Logistics Programs
Lucyshyn, William; Rigilano, John
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62921
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 









Volume II  
Acquisition Research: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 8–9, 2019 
 
Published: April 30, 2019 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 345 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
An Evaluation of Mature Performance-Based Logistics 
Programs 
William Lucyshyn—is the Director of Research and a Research Professor at the Center for Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. 
John Rigilano—is a Research Analyst at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the 
University of Maryland. 
Abstract 
For more than 15 years, performance-based logistics (PBL) contracting has been 
used to reduce weapon system sustainment costs and increase system reliability. In its 
simplest formulation, PBL “explicitly identifies what is required, but the contractor determines 
how to fulfill the requirement.” Often, the most significant improvements occur relatively early 
on in the PBL program. Typically, PBL programs evolve along a common trajectory. With 
new systems, cost-reimbursement contracts are used in order to provide the government 
customer and the provider with a cost baseline. Once the costs, risk factors, and system 
failure modes and rates have stabilized, the program generally transitions to the use of 
fixed-price contracts where providers are paid a fixed cost or fixed rate (e.g., per hour, per 
mile) so long as operational readiness is achieved at the specified level(s). Over time, the 
provider makes improvements to its supply chain, logistics networks, operations, and the 
system itself in order to reduce its costs and maximize profitability. In the “terminal stage” of 
its evolution, the exemplary PBL is characterized by high availability, reduced inventories, 
and efficient sustainment processes. This research examines three PBLs that reached this 
stage, including one program that reverted to the use of cost-plus contracts in an attempt to 
reduce costs. We found that long-running PBLs continue to deliver value, high reliability, and 
improved performance, and that distortions to the PBL paradigm (i.e., reverting to 
approaches that are more transactional) are unwarranted and may lead to unintended 
consequences that include higher future costs and decreased system readiness. 
Introduction 
Described by the Department of Defense (DoD) in 2001 as the “preferred approach 
to product support,” performance-based logistics (PBL) represents a radical change in 
contracting for maintenance, sustainment, and other after-sales support services. In its 
simplest formulation, PBL “explicitly identifies what is required, but the contractor determines 
how to fulfill the requirement” (Macfarlan & Mansir, 2004, p. 40). DoD guidelines state that 
“the essence of performance-based logistics is buying performance outcomes, not the 
individual parts and repair actions. … Instead of buying set levels of spares, repairs, tools, 
and data, the new focus is on buying a predetermined level of availability to meet the 
[customer’s] objectives” (Defense Acquisition University, 2005).  
There is now clear empirical evidence that PBL strategies, when properly 
implemented, can dramatically reduce system sustainment costs while improving overall 
reliability and performance (Guajardo et al., 2011; Boyce & Banghart, 2012; Lucyshyn, 
Rigilano, & Safai, 2016). It is noteworthy, then, that PBL contracting is not being 
aggressively pursued across the DoD. The overall number of PBL programs has waned 
considerably since its peak in 2005, when there were more than 200 programs in place 
compared to fewer than half this number by 2012 (Erwin, 2013). In dollar terms, PBL 
contract obligations have gradually declined in recent years after peaking in 2013 (Hunter, 
Ellman, & Howe, 2017; see Figure 1). 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 346 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
Figure 1. DoD PBL Contract Obligations by Initial Maximum Duration, 2000–2016  
(Hunter et al., 2017) 
In the early 2000s, criticism of PBL focused on contractor reliability (Gansler, 
Lucyshyn, & Vorhis, 2011). Critics argued that by allowing contractors flexibility, the military 
places itself in a dangerous position, relying too heavily on contractors who may become 
unreliable in the future. Others voiced concerns over whether contractors would be able to 
perform at the same high level during contingency and combat operations, especially if 
deployed in theater. Military planners feared that the “lack of control due to outsourcing 
could … put an entire military operation at risk” if, for example, contractors were to pull out of 
a war zone (Singer, 2008). To date, research indicates that these concerns are largely 
unfounded (Lucyshyn et al., 2016). Time and again, PBL-supported systems operating in 
stressful environments have met or exceeded performance requirements, contributing to 
mission success. 
Critics, including some within government, have moved to questioning the value that 
is obtained through PBL, as programs mature and the benefits, in terms of both cost 
reduction and performance improvement, become less significant. Could it be that once the 
“low hanging fruit” has been picked, incremental improvements become more difficult to 
achieve; that reverting to traditional, transactional contracting approaches makes more 
sense? Selviaridis and Wynstra (2015) note that it is unclear whether “performance-based 
incentives in long-term contractual relationships are sustainable over time as supplier 
learning occurs and service improvements become marginal” (p. 3520). This report 
addresses this concern. Ultimately, it seeks to determine if, and how, product support 
contracts should be modified over time in order to provide continuous value to the customer.  
PBL is still in its infancy. And given the fundamental change in functions and 
responsibilities—for example, the customer no longer manages (or in many cases even 
owns) inventory—it is not surprising that the optimal PBL contracting approach, specifically 
its development over the product deployment life cycle (as uncertainty in support costs 
change), has yet to be fully examined, let alone articulated. 
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Report Approach 
The objective of this report is to determine whether a “steady-state” PBL—one that 
generates continuous value to the customer—can be achieved, and if so, how to structure 
the optimal arrangement. This study relies primarily on structured interviews with program 
personnel in both the public and private sectors; the application of the academic literature 
(on contracting, management science, agency theory, and transaction cost economics) to 
PBL; and in-depth case studies of three mature PBL contracts. 
Background 
Over the last two decades, the DoD has focused on reducing the cost of weapon 
system logistics by constructing more sophisticated contracts with more favorable terms for 
the government (Butler, 2013). In addition, the military services are increasingly diverting 
their attention to sustainment costs—which are continuing to increase across the DoD—in 
part because the services cannot afford to replace rapidly aging systems. The DoD has 
identified PBL as its preferred approach to supporting weapon system logistics. 
PBL Basics 
PBL contracting, when used appropriately, can reduce sustainment costs relative to 
traditional, transactional approaches. PBL is a logistics support solution that transfers 
inventory management, technical support, and the supply chain function to a provider who 
guarantees a level of performance at the same, or reduced, cost. Instead of buying spares, 
repairs, tools, and data in individual transactions, the customer purchases a predetermined 
level of availability in order to meet the warfighter’s objectives. 
The optimal PBL contract is a multi-year agreement wherein the user purchases 
sustainment in an integrated way, to include elements of the system’s supply chain. Long-
term agreements allow the provider to incur up-front investment costs in the beginning 
stages of a PBL contract that are later offset by future cost avoidance. Whereas traditional 
sustainment contracts incentivize the provider to sell parts, PBL’s “pay for performance” 
approach aligns the objectives of the service provider, with those of the customer; and 
motivates the provider to reduce failures and resource consumption.  
As outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, a PBL’s performance is often 
measured through one or more of the following criteria.  
 Operational Availability: Percent of time that the system is able to sustain 
operations tempos or is available for missions 
 Operational Reliability: Measure of a system in meeting objectives set for mission 
success 
 Cost per Unit Usage: Total operating costs divided by the individual unit of 
measurement for a specific weapons system (flight hour, miles driven, etc.) 
 Logistics Footprint: Government or contractor presence required to sustain/deploy 
the system 
 Logistics Response Time: Time from logistics demand sent to completion of 
demands (labor, support, etc.)  
A successful PBL contract relies on performance metrics that are straightforward, 
measurable, and achievable. Additionally, these metrics must be carefully developed, 
implemented, monitored, and evaluated. Continuous communication between the program 
office and the support provider is crucial to ensure that these metrics are negotiated and 
executed in a manner that will ensure successful implementation of the PBL contract 
(Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2014). 
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PBL Advantages 
When implemented, PBL shifts the focus of the government’s efforts from 
transactions, to identifying performance outcomes and assigning responsibilities. The 
objective is to develop accountability, instead of relying on control. With PBL, active 
management of the sustainment process (e.g., forecasting demand, maintaining inventory, 
and scheduling repairs) becomes the responsibility of the support provider. Traditional 
logistics support dictates processes and specifications, which has the effect of constraining 
innovation and process improvement. Suppliers and equipment manufacturers are 
incentivized to sell more repair parts as opposed to developing and implementing reliability 
improvements. PBL changes the incentives for the supplier. The supplier is now incentivized 
to improve the reliability of systems and reduce inventories of spare parts, in order to 
increase profit. 
The DoD is gradually moving away from its traditional hierarchical command and 
control structure and towards a more adaptive system that will provide the precise, agile 
support required for the distributed, network-centric operations. In this regard, there are four 
distinct advantages associated with the use of PBL contracting: 
 Delineates outcome performance goal. The objective of PBL programs is to buy 
measurable outcomes based on warfighter performance requirements. They should, 
at the top level, be based on warfighter performance requirements, and include only 
a few simple, realistic, consistent, and easily quantifiable metrics. 
 Ensures responsibilities are assigned. PBL metrics, when properly developed, 
clearly define the suppliers’ responsibilities. 
 Reduces cost of ownership. This reduction results from the decline in inventories, 
improved supply chain efficiency, replacement of low-reliability components, and 
increased system availability. 
 Provides incentives for attaining performance goal. The PBL program should 
fundamentally align the interest of the supplier with that of the customer, and lead 
suppliers to assume greater responsibility for providing ongoing improvements to 
their products. PBL provides incentives for the supplier to improve design and 
processes and implement commercial best practices (Lucyshyn et al., 2016). 
There is ample empirical data that demonstrates that PBL, when properly 
implemented, produces desired outcomes in the key performance areas of availability, 
reliability, logistics footprint, and cost. Major systems including the C-17 and F/A-18, for 
instance, have all reduced sustainment costs by hundreds of millions of dollars, while other 
systems and subsystems such as the F-22, UH-60 avionics, and F-404 engine have seen 
drastic improvement in availability and cycle time (i.e., logistics response and repair 
turnaround; Fowler, 2008). Empirical analysis has demonstrated that PBL contracts 
incentivize reliability improvements of 25%– 40%, compared to more traditional transactional 
approaches (Guajardo et.al, 2012). Other government reports (e.g., Office of the Secretary 
of Defense [OSD], 2009) and think-tank studies have concluded that PBL offers distinct 
benefits that are difficult to achieve using traditional transactional approaches.  
PBL Contract Trajectory 
Ensuring a PBL contract is structured properly and contains the correct incentives is 
crucial to its long-term success. The Center for Executive Education from the University of 
Tennessee (2012) identified three factors inherent to a successful PBL contract:  
 Alignment: Both the contractor and government have embraced PBL as a new form 
of provider-client relationship and not merely a variant of business as usual. 
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 Contract Structure: The appropriate balance of risk and asset management is 
achieved, an environment is established that allows for creativity and shared 
success, and a pricing model is utilized that considers incentive types. 
 Performance Management: Desired outcomes and metrics for reporting and 
improving are established (Hunter et al., 2018). 
Typically, PBL programs evolve along a common trajectory. With new systems, cost-
plus reimbursement contracts followed by cost-plus incentive contracts are used to enable 
the government customer and the service provider to collect sufficient data to develop a cost 
baseline. Once the costs, risk factors, and system failure modes and rates have stabilized, 
the program should transition to the use of fixed-price contracts where providers are paid a 
fixed cost or fixed rate (e.g., per hour, per mile) so long as operational readiness is achieved 
at the specified level(s). Over time, the provider makes improvements to its supply chain, 
logistics networks, operations, and the system itself in order to reduce costs and increase 
profitability. A typical PBL contract pricing structure includes three components: 
 Share-in-savings, to incentivize the provider to reduce overall sustainment costs 
 A fee, to reward provider for meeting performance expectations 
 A fixed-price or fixed-price per operating hour contract schedule, to provide payment 
to provider regardless of quantity of parts or services consumed (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2017). 
In the “terminal stage” of its evolution, the exemplary PBL achieves consistently high 
availability, and efficient maintenance processes and supply chains. The program operates 
at lower risk, from both a cost and technical perspective. When this stage is reached, 
obtaining further performance improvements and price reductions will require increasing 
levels of innovation, since, presumably, the “low hanging fruit” has been picked.  
Since 2000, 68% of DoD PBL contract obligations have been awarded as firm-fixed-
price contracts, with cost-plus-incentive and cost plus award-fee being the next most 
common contract types (Hunter et al., 2018). As Figure 2 indicates, PBL contracts can be 
implemented at the component, subsystem, and system level.  
 
Figure 2. Level of Implementation and Contract Scope 
(Gourley, 2014) 
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Risk, Profit, and Contract Type 
Note that as the PBL matures, the contractor takes on more risk, which is reflected in 
the type of contract that is used (see Figure 3). As risk increases, so does the contractor’s 
opportunity to increase profit.  
 
Figure 3. Relationship Between Contract Type, Risk, and Profit Opportunity 
(Gourley, 2014) 
Some within government have become concerned by “excessive” profits generated 
by PBL contracts, even in instances where overall program costs have been reduced. This 
concern can manifest itself in disagreements between contracting officers (KOs) and 
program managers (PMs) over the type of contract that should be used—the former 
asserting that cost-plus contacts should be used to constrain windfall profits.  
It should be noted that the KO binds the government to a contract, the legal 
document that specifies program requirements. In many instances, however, the KO 
generally does not report administratively to the PM who, of course, is responsible for overall 
program performance and success, including contract execution. From the KO’s 
perspective, success is often construed narrowly. Was the contract awarded? Were protests 
avoided? Have costs been minimized? (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine, 2016). In fact, KOs, at times, dictate contract type and terms to the PM, which can 
lead to negative program outcomes (e.g., contracts may not take advantage of some of the 
flexibility available in the FAR, or be of the most appropriate length1). Needless to say, 
affordably providing the required capability to the warfighter should be emphasized over 
minimizing profits. As stated by the DAU (2018), “The Services’ primary concern is to pay 
less for more when compared to their current sustainment strategy, irrespective of industry 
profits” (p. 30). 
This is not to suggest that cost-plus contracts should be avoided altogether. As 
discussed, for new programs, a cost-plus contract may be essential to determining a cost 
baseline that can be used to develop future fixed-price contracts. In addition, when risk 
cannot be quantified or the cost of transferring the risk to the supplier “is more than the 
                                            
 
 
1 PBL contracts need to be long enough to enable the contractor to recover any investment made in 
product and process improvements. These contracts are, consequently, competed less frequently, 
which conflicts with guidance to compete frequently. 
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government can accept,” cost-plus contracts are preferable (DAU, 2018). Cost-plus contacts 
may also be preferable, as the component or system approaches disposal and emphasis 
turns to containing the costs associated with wear-out and obsolescence. As a system 
approaches retirement, cost-plus contracts may allow the government to better balance 
costs, risk, and performance requirements. There is also some theoretical evidence 
indicating that cost-plus contracts may be well suited to certain types of product support 
programs, namely simpler ones for which the scope of work is limited. Kim, Cohen, and 
Netessine (2007) model how the customer observability2 of two variables—the contractor’s 
cost reduction efforts and spare parts inventory—affect optimal contract choice. They show 
that when the supplier and the customer are risk neutral, “which may be the case in practice 
if the customer and the suppliers are well-diversified corporations” the combination of a 
“fixed payment and a performance component” (i.e., a typical PBL contract) is optimal, 
provided that the contractor’s cost reduction efforts and inventory levels are unobservable 
(Kim et al., 2007, p. 1857).  
Reliability and Ownership 
The reliability of a system appears to be correlated with the ownership of spare parts. 
That is, when the supplier owns a larger portion of spare parts, reliability is higher. Kim et al. 
(2011) found that “the full benefit of a PBC [performance-based contracting] strategy is 
achieved when suppliers are transformed into total service providers who take the 
ownership of physical assets” (p. 1). 
 
 
When non-performance based contracting strategies (transactional contracts) are 
used; reliability remains low with suppliers relying more heavily on a larger inventory of 
customer-owned spare parts to maintain the system. When non-performance contracting 
strategies are used, suppliers are not incentivized to improve reliability.  
                                            
 
 
2 Kim et al. define an “observable” variable as one “that is verifiable and hence can be specified in a 
contract” (p. 1849). 
Stryker: A Cost-Plus PBL 
When Stryker brigades supported by a PBL contract first deployed to Iraq, Army officials reported 
operational readiness rates averaging 96% from October 2003 through September 2005 (GAO, 
2006). In addition, the Army consistently noted that contractors were providing impressive levels of 
support and according to a 2006 GAO report, more knowledgeable and efficient than their military 
counterparts with regard to the specifics of the Stryker vehicles (GAO, 2006). 
From a cost perspective, however, contract performance is less clear. In 2012, The DoD Inspector 
General asserted that the follow-on contract’s continued use of a sole metric (readiness) in 
combination with a high-ceiling, cost-plus contract unduly incentivized the contractor to accumulate 
significant excess inventory valued at $335.9 million (DoD IG, 2012). The Army responded that the 
excess inventory could be attributed, in part, to contractor improvements in reliability, and that the 
spare parts would be used eventually, albeit at a slower pace than anticipated (DoD IG, 2012). 
Given the Army’s heavy reliance on Stryker during the Iraq War, changing operational tempos, and 
the lack of historical cost data, the use of a cost-plus fixed fee contract (as opposed to a fixed-price 
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Under fixed-price PBL contracting strategies, the optimal combination of reliability 
and inventory shifts away from inventory and toward improved reliability. In other words, the 
supplier makes investments in reliability (process, schedule, or technology), thereby 
obviating the need for a large parts inventory. The optimal combination shifts even farther to 
the right when spare parts are owned by the supplier. Cost of ownership is lowest under a 
PBL contracting strategy where spare parts are owned by the supplier. Kim et al. assert that 
when the supplier owns all spare parts, “the supply chain becomes coordinated.” They 
conclude that “Our analysis supports a DoD recommendation for transforming suppliers into 
total service providers of support services who, under the PBL arrangement, assume 
complete control of service functions, including asset ownership” (p. 1). At present, industry 
practice is for the customer to own spare assets “while the supplier decides on target 
stocking levels of spares and recommends to the customer a budget of spares acquisitions 
to achieve these levels.” 
It should be emphasized that these relationships hold only when fixed-price contracts 
are used. PBL arrangements that use cost-plus contracts can provide suppliers with the 
perverse incentive to accumulate spare parts, if those parts are customer owned (see 
Stryker inset). 
Long-Term PBLs 
In this section, we provide an in-depth examination of three mature, long-running 
PBL programs: The High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, better known as HIMARS, the 
Navy Aviation Tires Program, and the Apace helicopter’s Modernized Target Acquisition 
Designations Sight (M-TADS) system. The HIMARS PBL supports two major 
subcomponents, the Launcher-Loader Module and the Fire Control System. The Apache 
PBL provides subsystem-level support. 
HIMARS 
HIMARS is the latest addition to the military’s multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) 
family. Designed with the purpose of engaging and combatting artillery, trucks, air defense, 
light armor, and personnel carriers; it was a lighter, more mobile variation on the MLRS 
M270A1, with some common components. In addition to supporting troop and supply 
concentrations, HIMARS has been in constant demand by both the Army and the Marine 
Corps (as well as foreign governments) since the production of its first prototype in 1999. 
The HIMARS launcher is an impressive weapon that has continuously exceeded its 
operational readiness expectations. Initially developed through an advanced concept 
technology demonstration (ACTD) program by Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in 
1996, HIMARS has been referred to as “the most advanced artillery system in the U.S. 
arsenal.” Following their successful deployments during Operation Iraqi Freedom, HIMARS 
launchers have become indispensable to the arsenals of both the Army and Marines. 
A Brief History 
Originally conceived to meet the need for a lighter, rapidly deployable rocket 
launcher—HIMARS is a wheeled, agile, rocket and guided missile launcher fixed to a five-
ton armored truck (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2014). Owing to its wheeled chassis and lightweight 
design, the system can be easily transported by C-130, allowing it to be deployed to 
previously inaccessible areas at a moment’s notice (Lockheed Martin, 2011). The HIMARS 
has been internationally recognized for its highly efficient and innovative features, including 
the ability to take aim at a target in under 16 seconds, and rapidly move away from the 
launch site once a missile is released. In addition, its fire controls system, electronics, and 
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communications units are interchangeable with its heavier, tracked predecessor, the 
M270A1. 
Following the ACTD in 1996, Lockheed Martin was awarded an engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) contract for six launchers (and later an additional two 
launchers) in 2000 (Army-Technology, 2015). Not long after, in 2003, “the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps signed a contract for the low-rate initial production (LRIP) of 89 launchers for 
the Army and four for the USMC” (Army-Technology, 2015). As the United States’ role in 
overseas conflicts grew in the mid- to late 2000s, the need for HIMARS units grew (Army-
Technology, 2015). 
Since its introduction into the force in 1998, HIMARS has proven its value through 
both peacetime forcible-entry exercises and on operational deployments in the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (Russo & Hilbert, 2008). 
Program Description 
The Lockheed Martin HIMARS program office is headquartered in Dallas, TX, where 
numerous program functions are executed; these include program management, depot 
repair coordination, inventory control, contracting with suppliers, design interface, and 
database maintenance. The program database tracks the location of each launcher, 
including each spare part, indicates whether the part is functional, and provides its status 
with regard to the repair process. The DoD’s internal logistics systems rarely achieve this 
level of visibility for most weapon systems, often leading to ordering redundancy, misplaced 
orders, and an incomplete picture of program operations. 
The program also employs 31 field service representatives (FSRs) that operate with 
deployed units stateside and overseas. In-theater maintenance work is performed primarily 
by soldiers, while the FSRs facilitate the supply process by overseeing numerous functions 
(Hawkins, 2009). These functions include the following: 
 supply, receipt, storage, issue, inspecting, packaging, and shipping of 
subsystems and components; 
 data collection and recording (maintenance actions, supply transactions, 
operating hours, munitions status [deployment and garrison]); 
 system fault isolation using a variety of either built in or stand-alone test 
equipment; 
 replacement of assemblies, as required; 
 provision of technical assistance and support (both launcher and automotive); 
and 
 provision of an interface for “reach back” engineering support, enabling the rapid 
resolution of problems. 
Given the level of sophistication provided by the Lockheed Martin’s database and 
logistics networks, the FSRs are able to streamline and simplify the repair process for 
launchers. As a result, early in the PBL program, Lockheed Martin was able to reduce the 
number of diagnostic test units provided to each battalion, from six to one. In fact, soldiers 
operating the system in theater need only remove and replace defective line-replaceable 
units. 
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the HIMARS program is the provision of 
limited depot-level repair capability at each battalion, where repair work is provided by the 
FSR. Referred to as the capability to “Fix Forward,” some 50% of all HIMARS repairs are 
performed on location by the FSRs, eliminating wait times and significantly reducing costs. 
Moreover, the FSRs are trained to test and replace circuit card assemblies (CCAs), rather 
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than the line replaceable units (LRUs) in which they are housed, which reduces the overall 
logistics footprint and lowers costs —only the CCAs need to be shipped. This in-the-field 
repair capability has also significantly improved deployed launcher availability. According to 
interviews with Lockheed Martin officials, FSRs voiced few concerns over their work 
environments, safety, or civilian status within the battalion, with several volunteering to 
return for a follow-on tour. 
PBL Strategy 
The Army awarded the first HIMARS PBL contract to Lockheed Martin for $96 million 
in February 2004 (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2006). The four-year contract (one base year and 
three option years), referred to as Life Cycle Contractor Support (LCCS) ended in December 
2007. At this point, the Army had acquired 195 HIMARS launchers; and the Marines had 
acquired 40. Given its increasing inventory of HIMARS, the existence of a successful 
partnership between the Army and Lockheed Martin, and the cost benefits that derive from 
economies of scale, the Marines sought to support its launchers through LCCS upon 
completion of the initial contract.  
Accordingly, the second contract (LCCS II), a three-year contract (one base year 
with two option years) worth $90 million, was awarded in January 2008 to support both the 
Army and Marines’ systems. The shorter duration of LCCS II reflected significant risk 
associated with unknown launcher production quantities and price fluctuations for 
component spares (Gardner, 2008). A third PBL contract, for $158 million, termed Life Cycle 
Launcher Support (LCLS), extended HIMARS sustainment through December 2013 for 
services and through December 2014 for hardware.  
The initial PBL strategy relied on firm-fixed-price contracts with performance 
incentives3 for stateside operations, and cost-plus fixed-fee contracts for overseas 
contingency operations (Gardner, 2008). This strategy provided strong cost reduction 
incentives as well as the flexibility to meet overseas operational requirements. Moreover, the 
fixed-price was tied to an OPTEMPO category, with each vehicle assigned to a price 
category based on anticipated usage. 
The LCCS/LCLS contracts tasked Lockheed Martin with the full support 
responsibilities for the performance-based product support of the HIMARS and MLRS 
M270A1 launchers’ fire control systems, as well as the HIMARS launcher-loader module 
(Gardner, 2008). The commonality of support for the two platforms allowed the Army and 
later, the Marines, to take full advantage of the potential economies of scale in order to 
reduce costs (DoD, 2006). 
The LCCS/LCLS concept represented a significant evolution from the original M270 
MLRS strategy, according to which the majority of tasks (e.g., initial provisioning, inventory 
management, war reserve stock, repair and overhaul, depot maintenance, etc.) were 
provided with organic support. LCCS/LCLS, on the other hand, represents an ideal 
partnership; one in which the contractor assumes responsibility for providing technical 
support and user training in order to meet performance objectives, while at the same time 
                                            
 
 
3A fee was paid to the contractor on a quarterly basis provided that the performance requirements 
were met. 
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maximizing existing Army depot and acquisition infrastructure by relying on military 
personnel to operate and repair the system. 
Based primarily on data collection provided by Lockheed Martin during the initial 
contract, the LCCS team was able to make a number of changes to the LCCS II contract 
that would reduce future ownership costs. Notably, the team determined that the usage 
hours for the launchers varied significantly between active Army units and National Guard 
units (OSD, 2009). In an effort to reduce future costs, the less-used units were categorized 
under a lower operational tempo, which led to a reduction in needed support. Accordingly, 
Lockheed Martin and the DoD negotiated the LCCS II contract to reflect the anticipated 
savings derived through the reduction in operational tempo. These savings turned out to be 
considerable. In 2007—the final year of LCCS I—costs associated with operational tempo 
totaled $12.4 million; in 2009, these costs had declined to $3.8 million, for a total cost 
avoidance of $8.6 million.  
Initially, the PBL contained three contract metrics: system readiness, response time 
for part delivery, and repair turnaround time. System readiness was required to be 
maintained at or above a specified percentage (92% for LCCS I; 90% for LCCS II); however, 
this requirement was not included in the third contract.4 With regard to the second metric, 
the contract required that response time for mission capable parts deliveries fall within a 
specified range a certain percentage of the time, depending on the type of part. For 
overseas operations, the response time ranges were extended to provide the flexibility 
necessary to meet fluctuations in demand that might arise in unpredictable operating 
environments (DoD, 2006). The LCCS II contract, for example, required that response time 
be less than 48, 72, or 96 hours for U.S.-based operations, depending on the part (each of 
which is assigned to an Issue Priority Group), 92%, 91%, and 90% of the time, respectively 
(OSD, 2009). For overseas operations, the response time had to be less than 96, 120, or 
144 hours (OSD, 2009; see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Response Time Requirement for Mission Capable Parts Delivery 
                                            
 
 
4During this time period, the government sought generally to reduce the number of metrics used in 
PBL contracts to improve program outcomes and, in the specific case of HIMARS, eliminate the 
incentive fee tied to the readiness requirement, which was seen as redundant in light of the incentive 
fees tied to the other two requirements. 
Issue Priority Group Requirement Percentage Required 
1 48 hours (CONUS) 
96 hours (OCONUS) 
>92% 
2 72 hours (CONUS) 
120 hours (OCONUS) 
>91% 
3 96 hours (CONUS) 
144 hours (OCONUS) 
>90% 
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The third metric, repair turnaround time, specified the time period for completing LRU 
repairs. The contract required that LRU repairs be completed within a certain number of 
days a certain percentage of the time as defined by five “bands” (see Figure 5). This 
requirement was measured on a quarterly basis. As the figure shows, a majority of the 
repairs (65%) had a required repair turnaround time of less than 35 days.  
 
Band Repair Turnaround Time Requirement (Percentage of 
Total Repairs) 
Band 1  1–7 days ≥18% 
Band 2    8–35 days ≥47% 
Band 3      36–80 days ≤27% 
Band 4      81–90 days ≤8% 
Band 5 91 days 1% 
Figure 5. Turnaround Time Requirement for LRU Repair 
 
PBL Performance 
The HIMARS PBL program achieved success early on, reaching a 99% average 
system readiness rate, with no launcher out of service for more than 24 hours through 2015 
(Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2014). With regard to response time for mission capable deliveries 
and repair turnaround time, the program also performed extremely well. The CONUS 
average for mission capable delivery stood at 14 hours, the OCONUS average at less than 
one hour. Field repair turnaround time averaged 1.2 days and vendor repair turnaround 
averaged 34 days. 
The HIMARS program also tracked reliability through mandated field analysis 
reports, monitoring the mean time between both system aborts (MTBSA) and essential 
function failures (MTBEFF). Figure 6 illustrates HIMARS units’ reliability between 2005 and 
2015. Note that reliability among deployed Army units, as measured by both MTBSA and 
MTBEFF, climbed significantly during 2009 and 2010, before stabilizing at levels that 
continue to exceed average reliability across all units. The peaks in reliability correspond 
with peaks in the number of operational hours for deployed units (i.e., 3rd quarter 2009 and 
1st quarter 2010). 
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Figure 6. HIMARS Field Reliability 
(Lockheed Martin, 2017) 
 
Transition to Cost-Plus Contract 
Despite the program’s success, the DoD transitioned to the use of a cost-plus fixed 
fee contract in 2014, transferring much of the inventory management function from the 
contractor to the government, in an effort to further reduce costs through more direct 
government control. The five-year contract (one base year and four option years) extended 
support for HIMARS through 2018. Contractor personnel have suggested that the 
government-contracting officer pressed for the transition in an effort to constrain costs. The 
program continued to use the response time and turnaround time requirements. The 
response time (customer wait time5) requirement remains unchanged from the previous 
contract, whereas the repair turnaround time6 requirement was modified to specify two 
bands as opposed to five. As with the previous contracts, 65% of repairs required a repair 
turnaround time of 35 days or less.  
Unlike the previous fixed-price contracts, this contract specifies “stock objectives” 
and other inventory and operational constraints that the contractor must not exceed. This, of 
course, limits the contractor’s flexibility to leverage economic efficiencies when buying 
spares, virtually eliminating the incentives to invest in program improvements and thus doing 
                                            
 
 
5 Customer Wait Time: The number of hours that LCLS has from the moment an FSR submits a 
requisition until when that item requested is in the hand of the requesting echelon. 
6 Turn Around Time: The action of repairing a LRU to Condition Code A (serviceable—issuable 
without qualification) within the allotted time period. 
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away with one of the primary benefits of performance-based contracts. Because the 
program shifts most of the risk back to the government, some suggest that the program is a 
PBL “in name only.” 
One of the key questions government officials must ask is whether the new 
arrangement satisfies objectives of reducing cost, while meeting the requirement for 
HIMARS availability; both in the present and in the future. It may very well be that the 
government is, at present, receiving sufficient value, and taking on what it considers 
acceptable risk. Indeed, contractor personnel stated that the government has been able to 
take advantage of the “residual setup,” relying on the same proven processes and expertise, 
but in a more transactional environment in which spare parts procurement is constrained, 
ostensibly to reduce program costs.  
The program continues to perform well; response time and turn-around time remain 
well above the requirement and reliability has remained consistent (see Figure 7). During 
the initial contracts, Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors had invested more than $10 
million in design improvements, process changes, equipment and facilities to improve 
reliability and reduce costs. This resulted in a high level of system availability; reducing 
support requirements overall and enhancing mission success. The inertia from these 
improvements have enabled the continued high level of the programs’ performance and cost 
reductions. According to contractor personnel, DoD costs per launcher are less in 2018 than 
they were in 2005; the total price of the LCLS support contract in 2018 was less than it was 
in 2006, even though the 2018 LCLS program supported 643 launchers, compared to the 
286 launchers in 2005. The question is whether the same processes, level of detail, amount 
of effort, program improvements, cost reductions, and forward-looking approach can be 
preserved in a cost-plus environment over the long term.  
 
 
Figure 7. HIMARS Program Results FY 2017 
One would anticipate that the contractor would be reluctant to make any additional 
investment in the program without a reasonable expectation of getting a return on their 
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investment. Unsurprisingly then, contractor investment and surge capacity has indeed 
decreased following the transition to a cost-plus contract. According to contractor personnel, 
the program has not procured an LRU in five years. And, with a depleted spare parts 
inventory that is constrained by the contract, availability may not be able to keep pace with 
demand, should requirements dictate an increased operational tempo.  
In addition, although the costs associated with spare parts procurement may accrue 
more slowly under the current contract, they will likely end up being higher when compared 
to previous arrangements that permit more cost-effective parts procurement (e.g., “bulk 
buys”). In other words, the program may no longer be able to capture economies of scale to 
the same extent.  
The government has yet to release a Request for Proposals to continue HIMARS 
support beyond 2018. Contractor personnel believe that the government intends to ask for a 
one-year extension to bridge the existing contract as it continues to assess how support will 
be provided over a longer period, and an RFP for the new contract is released. 
Navy Tires 
In 2001, the Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) had already used PBL to 
transform other supply chains, improving performance and reducing costs, turning their 
focus to aircraft tires (Mahandevia, Engel, & Fowler, 2006). NAVICP was a Command 
responsible for more than 400,000 items of supply, and had an inventory valued at $27 
billion, with $4.2 billion in annual sales. As of July 2011, NAVICP was replaced by the Naval 
Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS). The mission of 
NAVSUP WSS is to “provide the Navy, Marine Corps, Joint and Allied Forces program and 
supply support for the weapons systems that keep our Naval forces mission ready” 
(NAVSUP, 2014). It should be noted that NAVSUP WSS only enters into a PBL contract 
after assessing and concluding that a PBL contract cost would be equal to or less than 
traditional support. Overall, NAVSUP WSS PBL contracts have reduced costs by 3.9% (The 
Naval Aviation Enterprise Air Plan, 2013).  
A Brief History 
Traditionally, NAVICP treated aircraft tires as a commodity; buying in bulk, and then 
storing them until they were needed. This resulted in a large on-hand inventory 
(approximately 60,000 tires) that may or may not have had the right mix of tires for the fleet. 
This inventory was maintained through small contracts for individual types of tires, which 
were awarded to a variety of manufacturers (OSD, 2012). The unintended consequence of 
this short-term acquisition process was that it sent erratic signals to the industrial base, 
resulting in less than optimal production runs, higher cost raw material sourcing, and longer 
lead-times. In addition, distribution services were provided by organic military resources, 
often with delays. In effect, operational units had to maintain a retail inventory. This resulted 
in higher overall costs to the fleet.  
Program Description 
The Navy developed a strategy to transition the provision of aircraft tires to a 
component level PBL. This strategy was implemented in 2000 and has resulted in a 
dramatic improvement in the availability of the required aircraft tires, with significant 
reduction in cost.  
Initial Contract 
In May 2000, NAVICP issued an RFP for a PBL contract to manufacture and deliver 
naval aircraft tires to all U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and foreign military sales customers 
(NAVICP, 2000). A firm-fixed-price contract was competitively awarded in April 2001 to 
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Michelin Aircraft Tires Corporation (MATC), Greenville, SC, to manage the Navy’s aircraft 
tire program. This contract had a five-year base with an estimated value of $67.4 million, 
supporting all 23 types of tires that the Navy used (NAVICP, 2001). This contract had two 
five-year options, and the resultant 15-year value for the contract was $261.5 million (PBL 
Award Summary, 2011). The first five-year option was exercised in July 2005, with an award 
of almost $92 million to MATC (DoD, 2005). The second five-year option was awarded in 
June 2010 and was valued at more than $101 million (Military Industrial Complex, 2010). 
This contract ended in January 2016.  
This initiative was the first time the DoD contracted out for the support for new and 
repairable tires. MATC was prime contractor for the program as well as the manufacturer 
and supplier of the tires. MATC maintained responsibility for requirements forecasting, 
inventory management, retrograde management, storage, and transportation (Mahadavia et 
al., 2006). MATC subcontracted with Lockheed Martin to provide the supply chain services. 
These services included demand forecasting, order fulfillment, and inventory management. 
In addition, Lockheed Martin also managed the commercial carriers (Bland & Bigaj, 2003). 
As part of their contract task, Lockheed Martin provided a service center that was 
available 24/7, called the Lifetime Support Command Center (LSCC). This center controlled 
all requisitions and maintained a real-time requisition status with web-based access, and 
was electronically interfaced with Michelin, the two warehouses, and through the Navy with 
the Naval Air Stations, Marine Corp Air Stations, carriers, and Landing Helicopter Assaults 
and Landing Helicopter Docks. This data, along with shipping status and product support 
information, was provided to Michelin to maintain their internal systems (Gansler & Lucyshyn 
2006; Mahadavia et al., 2006; Bland & Bigaj, 2003). 
The ambitious contract requirements were as follows: 
 95% on-time fill rate 
o 48 hours (2 days) within the continental United States (CONUS)  
o 96 hours (4 days) outside the continental United States (OCONUS) 
 Reduce retail inventories to a 90-day operating level (Bland & Bigaj, 2003) 
 Achieve and maintain a surge capability at a rate of up to twice the monthly 
demand rate of each tire type (Bland & Bigaj 2003; DoD, 2005). 
The Michelin-Lockheed Martin team developed internal metrics to measure 
performance to achieve the 95% on-time delivery requirement. These included dock-to-
stock time in warehouse, inventory accuracy, order fill time, and carrier performance (Bland 
& Bigaj 2003).  
The program shipped its first tires on July 9, 2001. Prior to this PBL contract, tire 
availability was 81%. As of 2011, backorders dropped from 3,500 to zero, and logistics 
response time dropped from 60 days to under two days in CONUS and under four days 
OCONUS. As of 2011, the average customer wait time was 32.1 hours CONUS and 59.5 
hours OCONUS, and on-time performance rates were 98.5%—well exceeding the contract 
requirement of 95% on-time (PBL Award Summary, 2011). These results were achieved 
during surge periods—supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom—with no reported impact to the fleet customer. 
Follow-on Contract 
The follow-on firm-fixed price contract was competitively awarded to Lockheed 
Martin by the NAVSUP WSS in February 2016. This contract had a base period of 
performance of three years, with two six-month options, at a total value of $131.3 million. 
The Navy estimated a total cost avoidance of $24.3 million under this contract. As the prime 
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contractor, Lockheed Martin has Michelin as a subcontractor, along with other tire 
manufacturers, such as Goodyear, to meet specific Navy requirements. The contract 
requirements were consistent with the initial contract, and through 2016 Lockheed Martin 
exceeded the on-time delivery metric of 95% with an on-time delivery of 98.2% CONUS and 
98.7% OCONUS. 
This high level of material availability provided by these PBL contracts enabled the 
Navy to completely draw down its former stockpile of wholesale tires from 60,000 tires to 
zero. By eliminating the Navy’s wholesale tire inventory, 280,000 cubic feet of storage space 
in the distribution depots were made available. This high level of availability and consistently 
reduced delivery timeframes significantly reduced the need for local retail customer 
inventory levels, which were reduced by 66%, with a value of $1.7 million. The Navy also 
reduced total ownership costs by handing off the responsibility for retrograde pick-ups and 
disposal of scrapped tires. Additionally, the quick retrograde pick-up time of 3.4 days on 
average eliminated the need for the labor and storage costs associated with retrograde tire 
management. By reducing wholesale/retail inventory and eliminating retrograde pick-up, the 
program demonstrated the Navy’s improved inventory management. 
Lockheed Martin’s best-in-class logistics support system (the LSCC) also allowed the 
contractor to notify the NAVAIR program manager with shipment dates and serial numbers 
in order to locate and quarantine any tires already out of the warehouses. This program 
demonstrated the benefit that the Navy received from a long-term contract based on 
performance from the private investment in product and process improvements, that results 
in cost-savings and improved support to the warfighter.  
AH-64 Apache 
The AH-64 Apache was conceptualized as a high-powered, tank-killing, attack 
helicopter, capable of repelling conventional ground forces during a Soviet invasion of 
Europe. Still an essential part of the Army’s fleet today, the primary mission of the Apache is 
to perform armed reconnaissance and conduct rear, close, and shaping missions, including 
deep precision strikes. 
Since its inception, the Apache has accumulated more than 3.9 million flight hours, 
with operational deployments during Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq. Although the first AH-64 was 
delivered to the Army five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Apache remains the 
Army’s primary and most advanced attack helicopter. Central to the Apache’s mission is the 
Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor (TADS/PNVS) system, 
nicknamed the “eye of the Apache.”  
A Brief History 
The first generation of the TADS/PNVS system was fielded by the Army in 1983. The 
system, which comprises two sub-systems, enables Apache pilots to fly at low altitudes in 
total darkness and poor weather. The TADS/PNVS system also provides a capability that 
allows the co-pilot to identify and engage hostile targets (Yenne, 2005). 
In 2003, Lockheed Martin was awarded a production contract for an upgraded, 
modernized version of TADS/PNVS. The M-TADS/PNVS, also known as the “Arrowhead,” is 
an “advanced electro-optical fire control system that AH-64D/E Apache helicopter pilots use 
for targeting and pilotage in day, night and/or adverse-weather missions” (Lockheed Martin, 
2015). The updated version is projected to lower sustainment costs by 50% over the 
system’s expected 40-year life span (Lockheed Martin, 2015).  
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Prior to the initial TADS/PNVS PBL contract, the sustainment cost for the Apache’s 
sensors systems averaged $218 million per year. Product support functions were performed 
organically, with Lockheed Martin providing “repair and return” services on a transactional 
basis (DoD, 2013).  
Both the original TADS/PNVS and M-TADS are designed around the concept of the 
Line Replaceable Module (LRM). Technicians remove and replace faulty components 
directly, restoring the system to service quickly. The faulty component is sent for repair off-
site. The LRM concept has been shown to reduce the cost, volume, and weight of spares 
holdings (Curtiss-Wright, 2016). The LRM design allowed technicians to remove and replace 
faulty equipment on the flight line. Intermediate-level maintenance of faulty components was 
performed at the division or corps level, while depot-level maintenance was performed either 
at the then Martin Marietta depot facility in Orlando, FL, or at subcontractor facilities 
(Robbins & McIver, 1994).  
A 1994 RAND report analyzing logistics support for the Army’s high-tech weapons 
found that the Army overstocked certain TADS/PNVS LRMs and understocked others. The 
report concluded that the inefficiencies in intermediate-level maintenance would limit repair 
capability to only 25% of all received platforms during a large-scale operation. The report 
attributed this limitation to the absence of prioritization mechanisms at critical repair facilities. 
In an effort to improve logistics efficiency, the DoD transitioned to a PBL in 2007. 
Program Description 
Since 2007, Lockheed Martin has provided sustainment for the AH-64 Apache 
Helicopter’s M-TADS/PNVS system through a series of three PBL contracts. The PBL 
program consists of three major functions: repair operations, logistics operations, and 
continuous improvement areas. Together, these functions established a system of 
continuous improvements supporting the Apache sensors and covered complete post-
production supply chain management, including inventory management, maintenance, 
modifications, procurement, repairs, and spares planning of fielded systems. In 2013, the 
PBL supported more than 670 aircraft in 27 battalions worldwide, including multiple forward 
operating bases (DoD, 2013).  
Repairs are performed at five special repair activities (SRAs). The largest of these is 
the Letterkenny Army Depot Partnership in Pennsylvania, which repairs 29 of the 53 LRMs 
on the M-TADS system. The partnership employs 14 personnel (six government and eight 
Lockheed Martin). Additional SRA locations are located in Arizona, Texas, Alabama, and 
Florida (Lockheed Martin, 2016). 
The second function, logistics operations, comprises U.S.-based depot support 
facilities and contractor supply support activities (CSSAs) located at domestic and overseas 
U.S. military installations and within close proximity to deployed Army units. The depot 
support facilities oversee the following functions: management of government-owned, 
contractor-managed assets; distribution of repair parts to SRAs; packing, handling, shipping, 
and transportation; and operation of storage facilities. The CSSAs consist primarily of 
forward-deployed Lockheed Martin-staffed support teams. In 2013, CSSAs had a presence 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, South Korea, and Kuwait (Lockheed Martin, 2016). The 
CSSAs serve as an information conduit between Army units and Lockheed Martin’s global 
support network. The CSSAs process repair orders, ensuring timely transportation of new 
parts from SRAs to deployed units.  
Finally, the continuous improvement function of the PBL consists of a dedicated 
team of Lockheed professionals that do demand planning, obsolescence management, and 
work to improve reliability and maintainability. The team relies on specialized IT tools, 
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including an asset management system that “provides data necessary to identify and 
implement corrective actions and proactively push improvements into the field” (DoD, 2013). 
Among its numerous functions, the team investigates new failure trends; reviews reliability 
predictions to determine current and future needs; and develops low impact, and easy-to-
implement solutions to recurring or emerging logistics or technical challenges.  
PBL Strategy 
The PBL has relied on firm fixed-price contracts that are tied to the number of flight 
hours. The program has established nine flight bands, each of which is designated by a 
maximum number of annual flight hours. The nine bands are separated by approximately 
20,000 hours; band 1 has a maximum of 87,000 hours, band 10 a maximum of 240,000 
(Lockheed Martin, 2016). Thus, the Army would pay the maximum annualized value of the 
contract during years in which Apache flies between 220,000 and 240,000 miles. This 
structure is ideally suited to heavily-deployed systems, such as the Apache. It provides the 
contractor with the traditional incentives associated with fixed-price contracts, translating to 
higher levels of innovation, reliability, and availability, while at the same time offering 
sufficient flexibility (e.g., the Army pays for actual usage) to support changes in operational 
tempo and accommodates multiple deployments (for instance, by establishing new deployed 
CSSA locations as needed).  
The first four-year contract (one base year and three one-year options) was valued at 
approximately $380 million. In 2012, a similar follow-on contract valued at $375 million was 
awarded (Lockheed Martin, 2012). A third, five-year PBL contract (one base year and four 
one-year options) was awarded in 2016. That contract was valued at $424 million and 
represents a price reduction of 10% over the previous contract (Lockheed Martin, 2016). 
Program performance is measured in terms of supply availability (SA) under the 
Apache PBL agreement. Lockheed Martin is contractually obligated to meet a minimum 
availability requirement of 85%. In other words, the requested part must be received by the 
requesting Army unit within the required timeframe 85% of the time. This timeframe varies 
depending on the type of part and the location of the requesting unit. There are three issue 
priority groups (IPG-1 is the highest priority; IPG-3 is the lowest) and two location 
categories—in-country and deployed. The program relies on this matrix to meet supply 
availability requirements. IPG-1/deployed have the shortest timeframe requirement, IPG-
3/in-country have the longest (Lockheed Martin, 2016). As with the contract structure itself, 
the supply availability requirement injects flexibility into the program and aligns contractor 
priorities with those of the Army.  
Prior to awarding the 2016 contract, the Army sought to reduce costs by extending 
the in-country IPG-1 timeframe requirement from two to four days. Although this change 
resulted in cost reduction, the savings were not large. The parts inventory stayed at the 
same level because the lead-time to procure parts still exceeded the required timeframe, so 
the change only affected transportation costs. 
PBL Results 
Under the initial contract, Lockheed successfully slashed sustainment costs for both 
sensor systems and improved supply availability primarily through improvements in supply 
chain and obsolescence management. Lockheed has since lowered logistics and 
maintenance costs by leveraging data tracking for health and maintenance indicators to 
improve demand forecasting, determining appropriate inventory levels, and by ensuring the 
optimal locations of supply activities. 
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Between 2007 and 2013, SA for MTADS/PNVS averaged 97%, well above the 85% 
requirement. Figure 8 illustrates annual availability by IPG between 2007 and 2011, followed 
by monthly availability between January 2012 and May 2013. Notably, a high level of 
availability was maintained between 2011 and 2013 when Apache reached its peak 
OPTEMPO of over 200,000 flying hours per year. In 2012, 96,000 hours were accumulated 
in Afghanistan alone. The other 115,000 hours were accumulated at locations in Kuwait, 
Germany, Korea, and CONUS locations (Lockheed Martin, 2016). The program has 
prioritized the availability of deployed units, which between 2012 and 2013, averaged 99%. 
As of August 2018, the PBL continues to exceed the required performance, and has a 
proven supply availability rate of over 99%, the result of efficiencies gained in supply chain 
management, valued engineering services, depot level maintenance, and retrograde 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 8. M-TADS/PNVS Parts Availability 
(Breter, 2013) 
Lockheed professionals working within the continuous improvement function have 
developed numerous solutions that have increased mean time between system failures 
(MTBF) by 70% compared to the pre-PBL period. Often “simple fixes” such as redesigned 
screws that strip less easily; a protective guard that prevents damage to exposed 
machinery; and improved airflow gaskets have all served to drastically improve reliability, 
durability, and overall performance. In addition, Lockheed has been successful in drastically 
increasing the annual retrograde rate—i.e., the rate at which repairable parts are 
transported to depots for repair, in preparation for those parts to be placed back into the 
supply chain—reducing the number of spares and the overall logistics footprint required to 
store and maintain them (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. M-TADS/PNVS Retrogrades by Year (Breter, 2013) 
The program also exceeded 99% availability for depot repair parts (see Figure 10). 
The PBL contract has been credited with improving fleet readiness, reducing average flying 
hour cost and reducing the Army’s long-term inventory investment. Over the course of the 
initial PBL contract, depot-level repairable costs were reduced by 18%, supply inventory 
replenishment costs were reduced by 40%, and mean-time between maintenance actions 
reduced by 9.6% (OSD, 2012). 
 
Figure 10. M-TADS/PNVS Depot Repair Parts Availability (Breter, 2013) 
As mentioned previously, annual sustainment costs prior to the implementation of 
PBL totaled $218 million per year. In 2013, costs totaled $92 million, a drop of 58% (see 
Figure 11). Other accomplishments include the mitigation of 759 obsolescence and 
diminishing manufacturing cases since 2007, resulting in $104.2 million in cost avoidance, 
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reduction of the maintenance support footprint, and a decrease of more than 1,000 
maintenance man-hours per year through increased materiel reliability (OSD, 2012). These 
efficiencies enabled the government to negotiate a price reduction of approximately 10%, 
reflected in the most recent contract awarded in 2016. In light of the program’s continued 
success, sustained high availability, and gains in affordability, the contractor team is 
optimistic about the program’s future. 
 
 
Figure 11. MTADS/PNVS Total Ownership Costs (Breter, 2013) 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
Long-running PBLs have the potential to continue to deliver value, high reliability, 
and improved performance. Based on our examination of the PBL construct and our 
evaluation of three successful PBL programs, we offer the following recommendations. 
Recommendations 
1. Promote the use of PBL as a proven support strategy for weapons systems 
throughout the life cycle. 
PBLs generally perform better than traditional support mechanisms. However, 
support within the DoD for PBL has appeared to wane in recent years. The benefits of PBL 
contracts continue to accrue as systems age; even with older systems, technological refresh 
and modernization initiatives create new opportunities to improve products and processes 
and reduce costs. 
PBL contracts may also be perceived as more expensive than support provided 
through a more traditional, transactional approach. Indeed, the price that an operational unit 
pays for a part may appear to increase as its reliability improves, but this is due to the 
operational unit’s portion of the contract payment being allocated over the total number of 
parts provided within a given period. When aggregated at the fleet level, costs decrease as 
reliability improves. 
The DoD should renew its commitment to the expansion of PBL in order to improve 
weapon system operations and reduce costs. This will require increased support from senior 
DoD officials and Service leaders to ensure that PBL is employed when developing product 
support strategy and arrangements. 
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2. Ensure the acquisition workforce is educated and trained to execute successful 
PBL contracts. 
Developing and implementing successful PBL arrangement requires a different 
skillset than that required for contracting for transactional product support. Critics suggest, 
perhaps rightly, that PBL arrangements can be more challenging to develop and manage 
than the more traditional transactional contracts. Specifically, the acquisition workforce often 
does not have a thorough understanding of how to select a contract type or structure 
contracts with the appropriate incentives and penalties to motivate industry to provide 
superior support while reducing costs. Accordingly, the acquisition workforce must be 
trained in the appropriate use of PBL contracts, and how to structure them with suitable 
metrics and incentives to achieve program objectives. 
3. Structure PBL contracts appropriately. 
PBL contract type should be structured to reflect the current phase of the system’s 
life cycle. When a system is mature and characterized by relatively low levels of uncertainty, 
both operational and technical, alignment of contractor and government objectives are 
optimized with fixed-price PBL contracts. These arrangements promote the greatest 
performance improvements and cost-reduction, higher levels of innovation, shift program 
risk to the contractor, and result in enhanced reliability. These contracts generally rely on a 
small number of performance metrics that directly support the stated outcomes, which help 
ensure transparency and accountability.  
a. Ensure proper alignment of government objectives with provider incentives. 
An appropriate PBL program uses the contract structure and incentives to align the 
objectives of the customer (the government), with those of the support provider, 
leading to a win-win scenario. The incentives should generally include a combination 
of rewards and penalties. Rewards can include financial payments and contract 
extensions for achieving cost and/or performance objectives. Penalties can come 
into play if the support provider fails to achieve the program outcomes and can 
include reduced fees and/or contract options that are not exercised. An inappropriate 
structure can create perverse incentives and result in undesired or unintended 
consequences. 
Again, the acquisition workforce must have a good understanding of what motivates 
businesses to ensure that the contractual incentives will achieve the desired 
outcomes. 
b. Consider scalability and usage requirements in developing the product 
support strategy. 
There are various strategies to build some flexibility into PBL contracts to account for 
changes in how systems are used. If these strategies are not used, the results can 
be suboptimal. For example, under the previous HIMARS PBL contracts, the fixed 
price was tied to OPTEMPO category, with each vehicle assigned to a price category 
based on the customer’s anticipated usage. In the event that vehicles are 
“underused,” the government customer may feel as though he is overpaying. On the 
other hand, M-TADS, tied the fixed price to actual usage (i.e., flight hour). When 
possible, PBL contracts should tie price to actual system usage. 
c. Use contract length to incentivize suppliers to improve reliability and reduce 
costs. 
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The Navy tires and M-TADS PBLs show that contracts of longer duration can 
incentivize suppliers to invest in reliability improvements, thereby reducing future 
costs. Generally, PBL contracts of shorter duration will not incentivize significant 
contractor investment since the contract must be long enough for the contractors to 
recoup their investments (otherwise they will not invest). Accordingly, future 
performance improvements and price reductions may not be realized.  
Conclusion 
As defense budgets continue to shrink, and operations and maintenance costs for 
weapon systems continue to rise, the DoD must heighten its focus on affordability and 
efficiency when it comes to new and existing weapon programs. With PBLs’ vast array of 
benefits, when properly structured, these contracts have the potential to dramatically reduce 
the costs of procuring and sustaining weapon systems, while incentivizing higher levels of 
performance throughout the system’s life cycle. As we continue to face new and evolving 
global threats, the demand for superior and highly reliable technology is now more crucial 
than ever. Although its benefits have been consistently proven throughout the years, PBL is 
still not being aggressively pursed throughout the DoD. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the power of PBL lies in affording the provider the 
discretion and flexibility to select the optimal mix of inventory levels, maintenance activities, 
and technology upgrades in order to meet performance requirements. The case studies 
presented here suggest that mature PBL programs are capable of exceeding performance 
and cost requirements. Shifting one or more of these functions to the government customer 
distorts the PBL paradigm and may, over time, lead to reductions in performance, 
innovation, and cost savings—if not in the short term, then in later iterations of the contract. 
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